

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JORGE TIRSE,

Plaintiff,

6:15-CV-0987
(GTS/ATB)

v.

DAVID GILBO in his official capacity as a Lieutenant in the Johnstown Police Dep't; JOHNSTOWN POLICE DEP'T; GLOVERSVILLE POLICE DEP'T; DONALD VANDEUSEN in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the Gloversville Police Department; LOUISE SIRA in her official capacity as District Attorney of the County of Fulton; JOHN P. SIRA, JR., in his official capacity as a Captain in the Gloversville Police Dep't; JESSE ASHDOWN in his official capacity as a Special Prosecutor and Assistant District Attorney in the County of Saratoga District Attorney's Office; FULTON COUNTY; MARK GIFFORD in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the Johnstown Police Dep't; and DARRYL BAZAN in his official capacity as a New York State Police Investigator in the Bureau of Criminal Investigation,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

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GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

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DECISION and ORDER

Currently before the Court, in this *pro se* civil rights action filed by Jorge Tirse (“Plaintiff”) against the County of Fulton, Louise Sira in her official capacity as the District Attorney for the County of Fulton (collectively “County Defendants”), the Gloversville Police Department, Donald VanDeusen in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the Gloversville Police Department, John P. Sira, Jr., in his official capacity as a Gloversville Police Captain (collectively “Gloversville Defendants”), Jessie Ashdown in his official capacity as a special prosecutor and an Assistant District Attorney for the County of Saratoga (“Defendant Ashdown”), the Johnstown Police Department, Mark Gifford in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the Johnstown Police Department, David Gilbo in his official capacity as a Lieutenant in the Johnstown Police Department (collectively “Johnstown Defendants”), and Darryl Bazan in his individual and official capacity as a New York State Police Investigator (“Defendant Bazan”), are Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. Nos. 11, 14, 26, 27, 30). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are granted.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges as follows. On November 29, 2011, Plaintiff's business was closed due to a civil dispute with his landlord, Joseph Andrews. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 1 [Pl.'s Compl.].) On the same day, Plaintiff was given a notice from the Johnstown Police Department not to trespass on the property. (*Id.*, ¶ 3.) On December 1, 2011, Plaintiff went to the Johnstown Police Department to file a complaint against Mr. Andrews and Mr. Andrews's friend, "Sgt. Stevens," for not allowing Plaintiff to access the property and for threatening to arrest him even though he had a lease with Mr. Andrews. (*Id.*, ¶ 2.) While at the police department, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Gilbo, who secretly recorded the interview. (*Id.*, ¶ 4.) In that interview, Plaintiff described everything that had happened. (*Id.*) The interview lasted nine minutes and 32 seconds; however, Defendants Gilbo and Bazan conspired to edit the video so it would show only three minutes of the interview. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 4-5, 31, 34.) The unedited video would have constituted proof that Plaintiff had not committed a crime; but, because it was edited, it depicted Plaintiff admitting to a crime that he never committed. (*Id.*, ¶ 7.) The video was later used in Plaintiff's criminal prosecution. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.)

On December 7, 2011, Plaintiff commenced a breach-of-contract action against Mr. Andrews in New York State Supreme Court, Fulton County. (*Id.*, ¶ 10.) The following day, Mr. Andrews filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff, alleging that Plaintiff had forged his signature on the lease. (*Id.*, ¶ 11.) This was a false accusation, evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff had sent the lease to the New York State Liquor Authority on November 23, 2011, one week before Mr. Andrews prohibited Plaintiff from entering the premises. (*Id.*, ¶ 13.) On January 13, 2012, Plaintiff was falsely arrested by Defendant Bazan for felony forgery. (*Id.*, ¶¶

14-15.) During Plaintiff's criminal and civil proceedings, he was advised by the court and Defendant Ashdown that, if Plaintiff dropped his civil suit against Mr. Andrews, the criminal charges against him would be withdrawn. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 16-17.) Defendant Ashdown was assigned as a special prosecutor to handle Plaintiff's criminal prosecution due to Defendant Louise Sira's relationship with Mr. Andrews. (*Id.*, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that the forgery charge was a "trump charge" to use as leverage against him and to coerce him into dismissing his civil action against Mr. Andrews. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 18-21.)

Furthermore, "in-house police reports" generated by the Gloversville Police Department were used in bad faith and to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 22, 26-27.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Sira conspired in Plaintiff's malicious prosecution by forwarding these in-house police reports to Gerard McAuliffe, Mr. Andrews's attorney, who in turn sent them to Defendant Ashdown. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 22, 24, 26.) Defendant John Sira knew that using or sharing these in-house documents violated federal, state, and local laws. (*Id.*, ¶ 29.) Defendant John Sira is married to Defendant Louise Sira. (*Id.*, ¶ 28.)

On August 15, 2012, Plaintiff received a copy of the video that recorded his interview with Defendant Gilbo. (*Id.*, ¶ 30.) Defendant Ashdown also received a copy of this video but claims he never watched it. (*Id.*, ¶ 33.) Plaintiff had difficulty viewing the video because it was saved under the editing software used by the police department. (*Id.*, ¶ 35.) Plaintiff went to the Johnstown Police Department and received assistance from an officer in accessing the videotape. (*Id.*) When Plaintiff finally viewed the videotape, he noticed that it did not end correctly. (*Id.*, ¶ 36.) As a result, Plaintiff made a Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL") request for the entire videotape, which was denied by Defendant Gilbo. (*Id.*) Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Gifford

regarding the matter, including the fact that the videotape had been tampered with and had been done so out of malice. (*Id.*, ¶ 37.) Defendant Gifford told Plaintiff that he “shouldn’t of [done] what [he] did” and hung up the telephone. (*Id.*) Plaintiff left several messages for Defendant Gifford but they were never returned. (*Id.*, ¶ 38.) Plaintiff also contacted public officials, such as the local Mayor, regarding the issue but to no avail. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 39-40, 43.) Plaintiff eventually sent the videotape to be analyzed and the results confirmed that it had been edited and tampered with. (*Id.*, ¶ 40.)

Based upon the foregoing allegations, the Complaint asserts the following eight causes of action: (1) a claim that Defendants maliciously abused their power by using legal process to accomplish some ulterior purpose outside the legitimate ends of process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986; (2) a claim that Defendants deliberately abused legal process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986; (3) a claim that Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986; (4) a claim that Defendants falsely arrested Plaintiff and deprived him of his constitutional rights in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988; (5) a claim that Defendants maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986; (6) a claim that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; (7) a claim that Defendants refused or neglected to prevent Plaintiff’s constitutional rights from being violated in violation of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (8) a claim that Defendants Gifford and VanDeusen failed to train, supervise, and discipline their subordinates in their respective police departments in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (*Id.* at 9-16.)

II. PARTIES' BRIEFING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

1. Defendants' Memoranda of Law in Chief on Their Respective Motions to Dismiss

a. The County Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Chief

Generally, in their memorandum of law, the County Defendants assert thirteen arguments with regard to Plaintiff's claims against them. (Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 5 [Cty. Defs.' Mem. of Law].)

First, the County Defendants argue that Defendant Louise Sira is entitled to prosecutorial immunity because (a) she acted within the scope of her duties in initiating the criminal prosecution against Plaintiff, and (b) she recused herself from the criminal prosecution itself. (*Id.* at 5-7.)

Second, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for abuse of process, false arrest, and conspiracy are time-barred by New York's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury. (*Id.* at 7.)

Third, the County Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because it does not allege that Plaintiff is a member of a racial minority or that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race. (*Id.* at 9.)

Fourth, the County Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because it does not allege that they acted with racial animus toward Plaintiff. (*Id.* at 10-11.)

Fifth, the County Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 because (a) it does not allege facts indicating that they had any involvement in Plaintiff's criminal prosecution, and (b) a viable § 1985 claim is a prerequisite for an actionable § 1986 claim. (*Id.* at 11.)

Sixth, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim must be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that they violated his constitutional rights. (*Id.* at 9-10.)

Seventh, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's malicious abuse of power and abuse of process claims must be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that they acted with malice and/or that they attempted to achieve a collateral purpose beyond Plaintiff's criminal proceeding. (*Id.* at 12-14.)

Eighth, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's false arrest claim must be dismissed because (a) the New York Court of Claims has already determined that there was probable cause to arrest him, and (b) the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting any involvement by the County Defendants in Plaintiff's arrest in that Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested by the New York State Police following an investigation by the Johnstown Police Department and then prosecuted by a special prosecutor from Saratoga County (i.e., Defendant Ashdown). (*Id.* at 14-15.)

Ninth, the County Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting a malicious prosecution claim against them because (a) the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff's criminal proceeding was initiated by the New York State Police as well as Defendant Ashdown and not the County Defendants, (b) Plaintiff did not receive a favorable termination of the criminal charges against him, and (c) the New York Court of Claims has already determined that there was probable cause to arrest him. (*Id.* at 15-16.)

Tenth, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's conspiracy claim must be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting a "meeting of the minds" between the County Defendants and the other Defendants regarding an agreement to conspire against Plaintiff. (*Id.* at 16-17.)

Eleventh, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed because (a) Plaintiff never served them with a notice of claim, and (b) the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that they engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct. (*Id.* at 18-19.)

Twelfth, the County Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting a *Monell* claim because it does not cite to and/or describe any Fulton County policy or custom that allegedly caused him a constitutional deprivation. (*Id.* at 20.)

Thirteenth, and finally, the County Defendants argue that Defendant Louise Sira is entitled to qualified immunity because (a) she recused herself from Plaintiff's criminal investigation and prosecution, and (b) the New York Court of Claims has determined that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and, therefore, Defendant Louise Sira did not violate any of his clearly established rights. (*Id.* at 21-22.)

b. The Gloversville Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Chief

The Gloversville Defendants have substantially restated all of the County Defendants' arguments in support of their motion to dismiss. (*Compare* Dkt. No. 14, Attach. 3, at 5-17, 22-23 [Gloversville Defs.' Mem. of Law] *with* Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 5, at 7-19 [Cty. Defs.' Mem. of Law].) Accordingly, for the sake of brevity, the Court will not repeat those arguments here. Rather, the Court will merely summarize the three additional arguments that the Gloversville Defendants assert.

First, the Gloversville Defendants argue that governmental immunity, which shields public entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions, bars any state law negligence claim asserted against them for the following reasons: (a) responding to a FOIL request is a discretionary act; (b) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that he had a special relationship with any of the Gloversville Defendants, which acts as an exception to governmental immunity; and (c) Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting either (i) the existence of a City policy or identifiable custom under which his alleged injury occurred, or (ii) a causal connection between such policy and a constitutional deprivation. (Dkt. No. 14, Attach. 3, at 18-19 [Gloversville Defs.' Mem. of Law].)

Second, the Gloversville Defendants argue that any claims against them in their individual capacities must be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege specific facts plausibly suggesting their personal involvement in the constitutional violations alleged. (*Id.* at 19-20.) More specifically, they argue that the only specific allegations regarding Defendant VanDeusen and Defendant John Sira are that Defendant Sira responded to a third-party FOIL request in his capacity as chief FOIL officer for the Gloversville Police Department. (*Id.* at 20.)

The Gloversville Defendants argue that Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that Defendant VanDeusen failed to supervise Defendant Sira when he responded to the FOIL request is insufficient to plausibly suggest a constitutional violation or supervisory liability. (*Id.*)

Third, the Gloversville Defendants argue that, in any event, Defendant VanDeusen and Defendant John Sira are entitled to qualified immunity because (a) even though these Defendants did not participate in Plaintiff's criminal investigation, the New York Court of Claims has already determined that there was probable cause to arrest him, and (b) the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that they violated Plaintiff's clearly established rights, or that they had reason to believe that Plaintiff's rights were being violated when they processed the non-party FOIL request. (*Id.* at 20-22.)

c. Defendant Ashdown's Memorandum of Law in Chief

Defendant Ashdown substantially restates the County Defendants' arguments in support of his motion to dismiss. (*Compare* Dkt. No. 26, Attach. 3, at 7-21 [Ashdown Mem. of Law] *with* Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 5, at 5-19 [Cty. Defs.' Mem. of Law].) Accordingly, for the sake of brevity, the Court will not repeat those arguments here.

d. Defendant Bazan's Memorandum of Law in Chief

Defendant Bazan substantially restates the County Defendants' arguments in support of his motion to dismiss. (*Compare* Dkt. No. 27, Attach. 3, at 10-20 [Bazan Mem. of Law] *with* Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 5, at 7-19 [Cty. Defs.' Mem. of Law].) Accordingly, for the sake of brevity, the Court will not repeat those arguments here.

e. The Johnstown Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Chief

The Johnstown Defendants substantially restate the County Defendants' arguments in support of their motion to dismiss. (*Compare* Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 3, at 4-7 [Johnstown Defs.' Mem. of Law] *with* Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 5, at 7-19 [Cty. Defs.' Mem. of Law].) Accordingly, for the sake of brevity, the Court will not repeat those arguments here. Rather, the Court will merely summarize the three additional arguments that the Johnstown Defendants assert.

First, the Johnstown Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against the Johnstown Police Department must be dismissed for the following reasons: (a) it is an administrative arm of the City of Johnstown and, therefore, does not have its own legal identity; (b) the County of Fulton is the proper party in interest; and (c) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting an official policy, practice or custom that caused his constitutional rights to be violated in order to state a *Monell* claim. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 3, at 9-10 [Johnstown Defs.' Mem. of Law].)

Second, the Johnstown Defendants argue that Plaintiff's state law tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence must be dismissed because (a) he failed to serve a notice of claim, and (b) the claims are time-barred by the one-year and ninety-day limitations period. (*Id.* at 10-12.)

Third, the Johnstown Defendants argue that Defendants Gifford and Gilbo are entitled to qualified immunity because the New York Court of Claims has already determined that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. (*Id.* at 12-13.)

2. Plaintiff's Opposition Memorandum of Law

a. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff asserts three arguments in opposition to the County Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 32 [Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. of Law].)

First, with respect to Defendant Louise Sira, Plaintiff argues that she is not entitled to prosecutorial immunity for the following three reasons: (a) she knew that she was not supposed to interfere with Plaintiff's prosecution but did so by reviewing statements made by Defendants, providing Defendant Bazan with a subpoena, and assisting him throughout his investigation; (b) she was aware of the conflict of interest regarding her involvement in the criminal investigation against Plaintiff but continued to assist in the investigation in order to find probable cause to arrest him; and (c) she recused herself only after the criminal investigation had been completed and she had collected sufficient evidence to secure Plaintiff's arrest. (*Id.* at 6-8.)

Second, Plaintiff argues that his *Monell* and § 1983 claims against the County of Fulton should not be dismissed for the following reasons: (a) the County violated N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 18 because of its numerous monetary contracts with the City of Gloversville and allowing Defendant John Sira to be employed as Captain of the Gloversville Police Department and Louise Sira to be employed as district attorney despite the fact that they are married, which created an inherent conflict of interest; (b) the County allowed Defendant Louise Sira to assist in the criminal investigation against Plaintiff despite the conflict of interest that existed due to her relationship with Mr. Andrews; (c) the County turned a blind eye to these numerous conflicts of interest; and (d) the County is vicariously liable for the actions of Defendant Ashdown because it appointed him as special prosecutor to handle Plaintiff's criminal prosecution. (*Id.* at 8-9.)

Third, Plaintiff argues that his claims for abuse of process, false arrest, and conspiracy are not barred by the three year limitations period for the following reasons: (a) he did not agree to a plea deal on July 5, 2012, but instead the criminal charges against him were dropped on that date and the case was ultimately dismissed on November 28, 2012; (b) he did not have knowledge of the substance forming the basis of his claims because all records were sealed by the N.Y. Supreme Court and he did not have access to them until they were released by the N.Y. Attorney General's Office in the subsequent N.Y. Court of Claims action on July 13, 2013; and (c) he received additional information regarding his claims during Defendant Bazan's deposition on May 30, 2013. (*Id.* at 14.)

b. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Gloversville Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff asserts four arguments in opposition to the Gloversville Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 35 [Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. of Law].)

First, with respect to Defendant John Sira, Plaintiff argues as follows: (a) he conspired with other Defendants and allowed "in-house" police reports to be used in Plaintiff's criminal prosecution, to maliciously prosecute him, and to coerce him into taking a plea deal; (b) he impermissibly sent these "in-house" police reports to Mr. Andrews's attorney, Gerard McAuliffe, at his request so that they could be used against him; and (c) he ordered his subordinates at the Gloversville Police Department to harass Plaintiff and his family. (*Id.* at 6-8.) Because of these actions, Plaintiff argues that Defendant John Sira was forced into an early retirement from the Gloversville Police Department. (*Id.* at 9.)

Second, with respect to Defendant VanDeusen and the Gloversville Police Department, Plaintiff argues that they (a) harassed and discriminated against his family, and (b) willfully ignored Defendant John Sira's unlawful conduct. (*Id.* at 8.)

Third, Plaintiff argues that the Gloversville Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because (a) they violated his constitutional rights, (b) Defendant John Sira violated FOIL laws and police department policies, and (c) Defendant John Sira was aware that his conduct was unlawful while Defendant VanDeusen was aware of this conduct as well but failed to intervene. (*Id.* at 12-13.)

Fourth, and finally, Plaintiff argues that his claims are not time-barred for the reasons discussed above in Part II.2.a. of this Decision and Order.

c. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Ashdown's Motion to Dismiss

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff asserts three arguments in opposition to Defendant Ashdown's motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 51 [Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. of Law].)

First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Ashdown violated his right to due process when Defendant Ashdown impermissibly conditioned any plea agreement to drop the criminal charges against Plaintiff on Plaintiff agreeing to discontinue his civil lawsuit against Mr. Andrews, paying for the locks to be changed on the subject premises, and moving his property out of Mr. Andrew's building. (*Id.* at 10-11.)

Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Ashdown conspired with Defendant Bazan by using his arrest as leverage to get the civil lawsuit against Mr. Andrews dismissed. (*Id.* at 11.) Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Ashdown conspired with Mr. McAuliffe by impermissibly requesting, and receiving, the "in-house" police reports from Mr. McAuliffe, which were then used against Plaintiff in his criminal prosecution. (*Id.* at 11-12.)

Third, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Ashdown is not entitled to prosecutorial or qualified immunity for the following four reasons: (a) Defendant Ashdown violated Plaintiff's

constitutional rights on numerous occasions as described above; (b) there was no probable cause to charge Plaintiff with felony forgery, a fact that Defendant Ashdown was aware of; (c) despite the lack of probable cause, Defendant Ashdown maliciously pursued the criminal charge anyway in an attempt to get Plaintiff's civil lawsuit dismissed against Mr. Andrews; and (d) Defendant Ashdown's actions were outside the scope of his duties as prosecutor. (*Id.* at 12-13.)

d. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Bazan's Motion to Dismiss

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff asserts two arguments in opposition to Defendant Bazan's motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 50 [Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. of Law].)

First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Bazan is not entitled to qualified immunity because (a) he tampered with evidence, coerced witness statements, and intentionally ignored exculpatory evidence, and (b) he engaged in unlawful conduct by tampering with evidence. (*Id.* at 10.)

Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Bazan tampered with the videotape containing his interview at the police station. (*Id.* at 7, 11, 14.) In addition, Plaintiff argues that the tampering with the videotape, coupled with the tampering of witness statements, negates the probable cause for his arrest. (*Id.* at 11.)

e. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Johnstown Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff asserts three arguments in opposition to the Johnstown Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 48 [Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. of Law].)

First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Gilbo is not entitled to qualified immunity because (a) he violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights by falsifying evidence and submitting it to the

court in order to facilitate Plaintiff's malicious prosecution, (b) he did not comply with Plaintiff's FOIL request but instead provided Plaintiff with an edited copy of his video taped interview at the police station, and (c) he has threatened Plaintiff's life for pursuing this matter against him. (*Id.* at 12-13.)

Second, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged facts plausibly suggesting a *Monell* claim because he has alleged that the Johnstown Police Department violated FOIL request laws by tampering with the evidence that he requested. (*Id.* at 11.)

Third, Plaintiff argues that his claim is not time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations period because he first learned on August 14, 2012, that the video taped disk of his interview at the police station was tampered with. (*Id.* at 8.)

3. Defendants Respective Reply Memoranda of Law

a. The County Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, the County Defendants assert seven arguments in reply to Plaintiff's opposition. (Dkt. No. 37 [Cty. Defs.' Reply Mem. of Law].)

First, the County Defendants argue that Defendant Louise Sira is entitled to prosecutorial immunity for the following reasons: (a) Plaintiff's various admissions and evidence contained in his opposition papers make it clear that Defendant Louise Sira played no role in his prosecution or the decision to arrest him; (b) even if Defendant Louise Sira processed a subpoena before being recused, this conduct was clearly within the scope of her duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution; and (c) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Louise Sira conspired with Defendant John Sira is speculative at best. (*Id.* at 2-3.)

Second, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are time-barred because his excuse that he did not have access to his criminal legal file until it was released by the New York Attorney General's Office is not valid for purposes of tolling the limitations period. (*Id.* at 3-4.) More specifically, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff, as a defendant in a criminal prosecution, had knowledge of the charges against him and was present and acting on his own behalf when the charges were eventually dismissed. (*Id.* at 4.)

Third, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 should be dismissed for the reasons stated in their memorandum of law. (*Id.* at 4-5.)

Fourth, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed because (a) he admits that he never served a notice of claim, and (b) he has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that they engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct. (*Id.* at 5-6.)

Fifth, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's *Monell* claim must be dismissed because he has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting and/or describing a policy or custom that caused his constitutional deprivations. (*Id.* at 6.)

Sixth, the County Defendants argue that Defendant Louise Sira is entitled to qualified immunity because, even if she did not recuse herself, the Complaint still does not allege facts plausibly suggesting anything that would have informed her that (a) there was insufficient probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and (b) she acted unlawfully or violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (*Id.* at 6-7.)

Seventh, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint because any amendments would be futile for the following two reasons: (a)

the documentary evidence submitted by Plaintiff in his opposition papers demonstrate that the County Defendants had nothing to do with his criminal investigation, arrest, and/or prosecution; and (b) his federal claims are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (*Id.* at 7-8.)

b. The Gloversville Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, the Gloversville Defendants assert six arguments in reply to Plaintiff's opposition. (Dkt. No. 38 [Gloversville Defs.' Reply Mem. of Law].)

First, the Gloversville Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for malicious abuse of power, abuse of process, false arrest, and conspiracy are time-barred because, contrary to Plaintiff's argument that he did not have the requisite knowledge regarding these claims until a later date, Plaintiff had knowledge of the charges levied against him (as the defendant in a criminal proceeding) and was present when the criminal charges were eventually dismissed. (*Id.* at 3-4.)

Second, the Gloversville Defendants argue that Plaintiff's §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims should be dismissed for the reasons stated in their memorandum of law. (*Id.* at 4.) Similarly, the Gloversville Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim for malicious abuse of power, abuse of process, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy for the reasons set forth in their memorandum of law. (*Id.* at 4-5.) In addition, the Gloversville Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to make any arguments in opposition to their motion to dismiss demonstrating that they had any involvement in the allegations serving as the basis for these claims. (*Id.* at 5.)

Third, the Gloversville Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not opposed their arguments for dismissal of his intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence claims and has not offered an explanation regarding his failure to serve a notice of claim. (*Id.*)

Fourth, the Gloversville Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not opposed their arguments regarding his failure to allege facts plausibly suggesting the personal involvement of Defendants VanDeusen and John Sira in the alleged constitutional violations. (*Id.* at 6.)

Fifth, the Gloversville Defendants argue that Defendants VanDeusen and John Sira are entitled to qualified immunity and Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a *Monell* claim for the reasons stated in their memorandum of law. (*Id.* at 6-7.)

Sixth, the Gloversville Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint because any amendments would be futile for the following reasons: (1) the attachments to Plaintiff's opposition papers demonstrate that the Gloversville Defendants were not involved with Plaintiff's criminal investigation, arrest and/or prosecution; and (2) the statute of limitations regarding the majority of Plaintiff's claims has expired. (*Id.* at 7-8.)

c. The Johnstown Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, the Johnstown Defendants assert eight arguments in reply to Plaintiff's opposition. (Dkt. No. 47 [Johnstown Defs.' Reply Mem. of Law].)

First, the Johnstown Defendants restate their argument from their memorandum of law that all of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, with the exception of his malicious prosecution claim, are time-barred and Plaintiff has failed to oppose the dismissal of those claims on this basis. (*Id.* at 2.)

Second, the Johnstown Defendants restate their argument from their memorandum of law that Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed because (a) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that the Johnstown Defendants initiated a criminal proceeding against him, (b) a termination in the interest of justice is not a favorable termination,

(c) the N.Y. Court of Claims has already determined that probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrest, and (d) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting either malice or that the Johnstown Defendants attempted to achieve a collateral purpose beyond Plaintiff's criminal proceeding. (*Id.* at 2-4.)

Third, the Johnstown Defendants restate their argument from their memorandum of law that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim under §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986. (*Id.* at 4-5.)

Fourth, the Johnstown Defendants restate their argument that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting the personal involvement of Defendant Gifford in a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights and Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant Gifford advised him over the telephone that he "shouldn't of did what [he] did" and hung up is insufficient to state a claim. (*Id.* at 5.)

Fifth, the Johnstown Defendants restate their arguments from their memorandum of law that the claims against the Johnstown Police Department must be dismissed because it is a non-legal entity and he has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a *Monell* claim. (*Id.* at 5-6.)

Sixth, the Johnstown Defendants argue that Plaintiff's state law claims must be dismissed because (a) he failed to serve a notice of claim, and (b) they are time-barred by the one-year-and-ninety-day statute of limitations period. (*Id.* at 6-7.)

Seventh, the Johnstown Defendants restate their arguments from their memorandum of law that Defendants Gifford and Gilbo are entitled to qualified immunity. (*Id.* at 7-8.)

Eighth, the Johnstown Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint because any amendments would be futile. (*Id.* at 8-10.)

d. Defendant Ashdown's Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, Defendant Ashdown asserts seven arguments in reply to Plaintiff's opposition. (Dkt. No. 52 [Def. Ashdown's Reply Mem. of Law].)

First, Defendant Ashdown argues that the Court should disregard Plaintiff's opposition papers because they were filed three days after the deadline set by the Court and Plaintiff has not offered any explanation for his delayed filing. (*Id.* at 2.)

Second, Defendant Ashdown argues that, even if the Court considers Plaintiff's opposition papers, he is still entitled to prosecutorial immunity because (a) Plaintiff's admissions and "evidence" contained in his opposition papers demonstrate that Defendant Ashdown acted exclusively within his role as special prosecutor, (b) all activities Plaintiff argues that Defendant Ashdown engaged in were also within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, and (c) Plaintiff's continued speculation that Defendant Ashdown acted in concert with law enforcement agents or the other Defendants is speculative at best and does not plausibly suggest a claim. (*Id.* at 2-3.)

Third, Defendant Ashdown restates the argument from his memorandum of law that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for malicious abuse of power, abuse of process, false arrest, and conspiracy are time-barred by the statute of limitations. (*Id.* at 3.)

Fourth, Defendant Ashdown restates his arguments from his memorandum of law that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. (*Id.* at 4.)

Fifth, Defendant Ashdown argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because (a) any alleged tortious

acts by Defendant Ashdown were taken within the scope of his role as special prosecutor, (b) Plaintiff has offered nothing more than conclusory assertions that Defendant Ashdown acted in concert with other Defendants for personal and/or nefarious reasons, and (c) no rational fact-finder could find that Defendant Ashdown engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. (*Id.* at 5.)

Sixth, Defendant Ashdown argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for the reasons stated in his memorandum of law. (*Id.* at 5-6.)

Seventh, and finally, Defendant Ashdown argues that, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff should not be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint because any amendments would be futile. (*Id.* at 6-7.)

e. Defendant Bazan's Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, Defendant Bazan asserts four arguments in reply to Plaintiff's opposition. (Dkt. No. 55 [Def. Bazan's Reply Mem. of Law].)

First, Defendant Bazan argues that Plaintiff's opposition papers should not be considered because they were filed after the deadline set by this Court. (*Id.* at 1.)

Second, Defendant Bazan argues that Plaintiff has failed to refute the fact that the N.Y. Court of Claims has already determined that probable cause existed for his arrest. (*Id.*)

Third, Defendant Bazan argues that Plaintiff has failed to respond to the arguments that his claims are time-barred and that Defendant Bazan is entitled to qualified immunity. (*Id.* at 2.)

Fourth, and finally, Defendant Bazan argues that Plaintiff should not be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint because (1) any amendments would be futile, (2) Plaintiff has not filed a proposed amended complaint, and (3) there are no meritorious claims that can be asserted against Defendant Bazan. (*Id.*)

III. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD

It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds: (1) a challenge to the “sufficiency of the pleading” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. *Jackson v. Onondaga Cty.*, 549 F. Supp. 2d 204, 211, nn. 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J., adopting Report-Recommendation on *de novo* review).

Because such dismissals are often based on the first ground, a few words regarding that ground are appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading contain “a *short and plain* statement of the claim *showing* that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) [emphasis added]. In the Court’s view, this tension between permitting a “short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement to relief is often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain” pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as “simplified” and “liberal.” *Jackson*, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212, n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that, by requiring the above-described “showing,” the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement that “give[s] the defendant *fair notice* of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Jackson*, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212, n.17 (citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has explained that such *fair notice* has the important purpose of “enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper decision

on the merits” by the court. *Jackson*, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212, n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases); *Rusyniak v. Gensini*, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal” notice pleading standard “has its limits.” 2 *Moore’s Federal Practice* § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding that a pleading has failed to meet the “liberal” notice pleading standard. *Rusyniak*, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 213, n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).

Most notably, in *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, the Supreme Court reversed an appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). In doing so, the Court “retire[d]” the famous statement by the Court in *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” *Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69. Rather than turn on the *conceivability* of an actionable claim, the Court clarified, the “fair notice” standard turns on the *plausibility* of an actionable claim. *Id.* at 1965-74. The Court explained that, while this does not mean that a pleading need “set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based],” it does mean that the pleading must contain at least “some factual allegation[s].” *Id.* at 1965. More specifically, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a plausible level],” assuming (of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. *Id.*

As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]. However, while the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” *id.*, it “does not impose a probability requirement.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556.

Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. *Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and alterations omitted). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” *Id.* (citations omitted).

This pleading standard applies even to *pro se* litigants. While the special leniency afforded to *pro se* civil rights litigants somewhat loosens the procedural rules governing the form of pleadings (as the Second Circuit has observed), it does not completely relieve a *pro se* plaintiff of the duty to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 10 and 12.¹

¹ See *Vega v. Artus*, 610 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196 & nn.8-9 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing Second Circuit cases); *Rusyniak*, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 214 & n.34 (citing Second Circuit cases).

Rather, as both the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have repeatedly recognized, the requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 10 and 12 are procedural rules that even *pro se* civil rights plaintiffs must follow.² Stated more simply, when a plaintiff is proceeding *pro se*, “all normal rules of pleading are not absolutely suspended.” *Jackson*, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 214, n.28 [citations omitted].³

Finally, a few words are appropriate regarding what documents are considered when a dismissal for failure to state a claim is contemplated. Generally, when contemplating a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the following matters outside the four corners of the complaint may be considered without triggering the standard governing a motion for summary judgment: (1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer, (2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3) documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4)

² See *Rosendale v. Brusie*, 374 F. App’x 195, 196 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough the courts remain obligated to construe a *pro se* complaint liberally, . . . the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard.”); *Vega*, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 196, n.10 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); *Rusyniak*, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 214 & n.34 (citing Second Circuit cases).

³ It should be emphasized that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8’s plausibility standard, explained in *Twombly*, was in no way retracted or diminished by the Supreme Court’s decision (two weeks later) in *Erickson v. Pardus*, in which (when reviewing a *pro se* pleading) the Court stated, “Specific facts are not necessary” to successfully state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). *Erickson v. Pardus*, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) [emphasis added]. That statement was merely an abbreviation of the often-repeated point of law—first offered in *Conley* and repeated in *Twombly*—that a pleading need not “set out *in detail* the facts upon which [the claim is based]” in order to successfully state a claim. *Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. 1965, n.3 (citing *Conley*, 355 U.S. at 47) [emphasis added]. That statement did not mean that all pleadings may achieve the requirement of “fair notice” without ever alleging any facts whatsoever. Clearly, there must still be enough fact set out (however set out, whether in detail or in a generalized fashion) to raise a right to relief above the speculative level to a plausible level. See *Rusyniak*, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 214 & n.35 (explaining holding in *Erickson*).

any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.⁴

Moreover, in the Second Circuit, a *pro se* plaintiff's papers in response to a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be considered as effectively amending the allegations of his complaint—to the extent those papers are consistent with the allegations in the complaint.⁵

⁴ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”); *L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC*, No. 10-573, 2011 WL 2135734, at *1 (2d Cir. June 1, 2011) (explaining that conversion from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim to a motion for summary judgment is not necessary under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[d] if the “matters outside the pleadings” in consist of [1] documents attached to the complaint or answer, [2] documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), [3] documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or [4] any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case); *DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C.*, 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that a district court considering a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6) “may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. . . . Where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint. . . . However, even if a document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document. It must also be clear that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; *Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.*, 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); *Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir.1995) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint,” the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding [a] defendant's motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

⁵ See *Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.*, 147 F.3d 169, 170 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (“[W]e deem Drake's complaint to include the facts contained in his memorandum of law filed in response to Delta's 1996 motion to dismiss.”); *Gill v. Mooney*, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (“In his affidavit submitted in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, Gill asserts that Mooney's actions amounted to deliberate and willful indifference. Liberally construed under *pro se* pleading standards, Gill's allegations against Mooney involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety, . . . and therefore state a colorable claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *Donhauser v. Goord*, 314 F. Supp. 2d 119, 212 (N.D.N.Y.) (Sharpe, M.J.) (“[I]n cases where a *pro se* plaintiff is faced with a motion to dismiss, it is appropriate for the court to consider materials outside of the complaint to the extent they “are consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”) (collecting district court cases), *vacated on other grounds*, 317 F. Supp. 2d 160 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (Hurd, J.).

IV. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the Court must determine what extraneous documents it may consider in deciding Defendants' respective motions. More specifically, Defendants have submitted a decision and order from the New York Court of Claims in a related state court action where Plaintiff sued the State of New York for false arrest and defamation. (Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 4 [N.Y. Court of Claims Op.].) Defendants argue that the Court can take judicial notice of this document. (Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 5, at 3 [Cty. Defs.' Mem. of Law].) In opposing Defendants' respective motions, Plaintiff appears to have submitted all of the exhibits that were filed in that action, including various deposition transcripts. (Dkt. No. 51, Attach. 1.)

As discussed above in Part III of this Decision and Order, there are four circumstances under which the Court may consider materials outside of the pleadings, including documents that the Court may take judicial notice of. State court decisions are clearly public documents that fall under this category. *See Johnson v. Pugh*, 11-CV-0385, 2013 WL 3013661, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013) (stating that, "[a] court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including . . . decisions in prior state court adjudications"); *accord, Nemeth v. Vill. of Hancock*, 10-CV-1161, 2011 WL 56063, at *1 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2011) (McAvoy, J.) (collecting cases); *Barnes v. Cty. of Monroe*, 85 F. Supp. 3d 696, 723 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendants that it may take judicial notice of the decision and order from the New York Court of Claims. However, in so doing, the Court may take judicial notice "only to establish the existence of the opinion, not for the truth of the facts asserted in the opinion." *Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York*, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The Court reaches a different conclusion with respect to the documents submitted by Plaintiff for the following three reasons. First, Plaintiff does not explain how the documents may be properly considered by the Court. Although it is conceivable that they could be considered public documents, Plaintiff admits that not all of the exhibits (without identifying which ones) were properly filed with the New York Court of Claims. (Dkt. No. 51, at 16 [Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. of Law] [stating that “my evidence was not submitted in the right form and was not considered”].) Similarly, the decision and order indicates that the New York Court of Claims did not consider the exhibits submitted by Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 4, at 7.)

Second, with respect to the deposition transcripts, the Court finds that they cannot be properly considered as either incorporated by reference or integral to the Complaint. The Complaint neither expressly references the depositions, nor does it bear any indication that they were substantially relied upon in its drafting. *See Goel v. Bunge, Ltd.*, 820 F.3d 554, 560 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding error in district court’s decision to consider deposition testimony from an underlying state court action and stating that “[a] complaint that alleges facts related to or gathered during a separate litigation does not open the door to consideration, on a motion to dismiss, of any and all documents filed in connection with that litigation”); *see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rozenberg*, 771 F. Supp. 2d 254, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (declining to consider deposition transcript because the complaint did not make any reference to it and the plaintiffs did not “purport to have relied on [the] deposition in crafting the allegations”).

Third, in any event, the Court has reviewed the exhibits submitted by Plaintiff and it is apparent that, even if the Court were to consider them, they are immaterial to the Court’s adjudication of Defendants’ respective motions.

Having resolved this issue, the Court now turns to its analysis of the issues raised in Defendants' respective motions.

A. Whether Plaintiff's Malicious Prosecution Claim Should Be Dismissed

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in Defendants' respective memoranda of law. *See, supra*, Part II of this Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.

"To state a claim for malicious prosecution under New York law, the plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor; (3) there was no probable cause for the criminal charge; and (4) the defendant acted maliciously." *Brandon v. City of New York*, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In addition, the Court of Appeals requires that in order 'to sustain a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, there must be a seizure or other perversion of proper legal procedures implicating claimant's personal liberty and privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment.'" *Brandon*, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting *Washington v. Cty. of Rockland*, 373 F.3d 310, 316 [2d Cir. 2004]).

As discussed above, Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because (1) the dismissal of Plaintiff's criminal proceeding in the interest of justice is not a termination in his favor, and (2) the New York Court of Claims has determined that there was probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest. With respect to the first argument, it is true that the Second Circuit has held that "[a] dismissal 'in the interest of justice' under [N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 170.40] cannot provide the favorable termination required as the basis for a claim of malicious prosecution." *Lynch v. Suffolk Cty. Police Dep't, Inc.*, 348 F. App'x 672, 674 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations omitted); *accord*, *Murphy v. Gibbons*, 13-CV-1433, 2014 WL 4828126, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014) (Sharpe, C.J.). However, other courts in this Circuit have recognized that, in *Cantalino v. Danner*, 96 N.Y.2d 391 (N.Y. 2001), the New York Court of Appeals rejected this proposition as a *per se* rule. *See Guzman v. U.S.*, 11-CV-5834, 2013 WL 543343, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013) (stating that, “[b]ecause *Lynch* relies on *Hygh*, it appears that the Second Circuit overlooked the Court of Appeals’ clarification of the law in *Cantalino*. Indeed, even after the Second Circuit decided *Lynch*, other judges [in this Circuit] have seen fit to apply the rule of *Cantalino*.”); *see also Norton v. Town of Brookhaven*, 47 F. Supp. 3d 152, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases). Indeed, in *Cantalino*, the New York Court of Appeals explained that, while “there are circumstances where a dismissal in the interest of justice is inconsistent with innocence because it represents mercy requested or accepted by the accused,” the Court’s past decisions did “not establish a *per se* rule that a dismissal in the interest of justice can never constitute a favorable termination. Rather . . . the question is whether, under the circumstances of each case, the disposition was inconsistent with the innocence of the accused.” *Cantalino*, 96 N.Y. 2d at 396-97.

The Court need not linger on this issue, however, because it agrees with Defendants’ second argument: that dismissal of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is warranted on the grounds that the N.Y. Court of Claims has already determined that probable cause existed for his arrest. *See Martin v. Cty. of Nassau*, 692 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he Court takes judicial notice of the fact that another court has already found probable cause for the plaintiff’s arrest.”). Although Plaintiff appears to contest this determination in his opposition papers, he is collaterally estopped from doing so. Specifically, “[t]he doctrine of collateral

estoppel, or issue preclusion, refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been litigated and decided.” *Sahni v. Legal Servs. of the Hudson Valley*, 14-CV-1616, 2015 WL 4879160, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2015). “[I]nferior federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over suits that seek direct review of judgments of state courts, or that seek to resolve issues that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with earlier state court determinations.” *Vargas v. City of New York*, 377 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 2004). Under federal law, collateral estoppel applies when: “(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” *Austin v. Downs, Rachlin & Martin*, 270 F. App’x 52, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2008). Similarly, under New York law, federal courts must give preclusive effect to state court judgments “if the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in an earlier action.” *LaFleur v. Whitman*, 300 F.3d 256, 271 (2d Cir. 2002).

Here, the N.Y. Court of Claims dismissed Plaintiff’s false arrest claim as a matter of law, finding that “Claimant fails to raise any genuine issues of material fact which illustrate that Investigator Bazan lacked probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed.” (Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 4, at 6.) The Court of Claims then held that, because “Claimant’s arrest is privileged . . . Defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging false arrest.” (*Id.* at 7.) A lack of probable cause is a necessary element of claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Furthermore, Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue

of probable cause through the summary judgment motion filed in the N.Y. Court of Claims. *See Tobias v. First City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.*, 709 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that “[a] fully litigated and opposed summary judgment determination can constitute the requisite full and fair opportunity to litigate”). Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot establish that probable cause was lacking, his malicious prosecution claim is dismissed. *See Mitchell v. Hartnett*, 262 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (state court decision collaterally estopped plaintiff from relitigating the lawfulness of his arrest via § 1983 claim); *Boomer v. Bruno*, 134 F. Supp. 2d 262, 268-69 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (Kahn, J.) (dismissing § 1983 malicious prosecution claim where state court previously determined the issue); *Graebe v. Falcetta*, 726 F. Supp. 36, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (giving preclusive effect to probable cause determination in underlying state court action when dismissing subsequent § 1983 malicious prosecution claim).

B. Whether Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims for “Malicious Abuse of Power,”⁶ Malicious Abuse of Process, and False Arrest Are Time-Barred

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in Defendants’ respective memoranda of law. *See, supra*, Part II of this Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.

“Under New York law, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, including false arrest and malicious abuse of process, is three years.” *Anderson v. Cty. of Putnam*, 14-CV-7162, 2016 WL 297737, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2016). A § 1983 claim accrues “when the alleged conduct has caused the claimant harm and the claimant knows or has reason to know of the allegedly

⁶ Although Plaintiff titles this claim as “Malicious Abuse of Power,” it is clear from a reading of the substantive allegations that this is a claim for malicious abuse of process. (Dkt. No. 1, at 9 [Pl.’s Compl.])

impermissible conduct and the resulting harm.” *Veal v. Geraci*, 23 F.3d 722, 724 (2d Cir. 1994); *see also Singleton v. City of New York*, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that a claim accrues under § 1983 “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. . .”). “Ordinarily, a claim for abuse of process accrues at such time as the criminal process is set in motion—typically at arrest—against the plaintiff.” *Duamutef v. Morris*, 956 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Sotomayor, J.); *accord, Anderson*, 2016 WL 297737, at *3. Similarly, “[a] claim for false arrest generally accrues on the date of the arrest.” *Harrison v. New York*, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

In the present case, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was arrested on January 13, 2012. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 14 [Pl.’s Compl.].) Plaintiff commenced this action on August 13, 2015, which is three years and eight months after his arrest. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for false arrest, malicious abuse of power, and abuse of process are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

In any event, the Court would dismiss Plaintiff’s false arrest claim because probable cause for his arrest has already been determined by the N.Y. Court of Claims as discussed above in Part IV.A. of this Decision and Order. *See McBride v. Bratton*, 95-CV-9626, 1996 WL 636075, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1996) (Chin, J.), *aff’d*, 122 F.3d 1056 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing § 1983 false arrest claim where state court previously determined officers had probable cause to arrest); *accord, Brown v. De Fillipis*, 717 F. Supp. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); *see also Simpson v. City of New York*, 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that “[p]robable cause is a complete defense to false arrest claims”). With respect to Plaintiff’s malicious abuse of process claim, “[c]ourts in this Circuit appear to be divided on whether the existence of

probable cause defeats a claim for malicious abuse of process.” *Posner v. City of New York*, 11-CV-4859, 2014 WL 185880, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014); *see also Deanda v. Hicks*, 137 F. Supp. 3d 543, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (collecting cases); *cf. Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue*, 808 F.3d 951, 958 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing the confusion surrounding this issue but declining to resolve it).⁷ Nevertheless, the Court would dismiss Plaintiff’s malicious abuse of process claim for the alternative reason that he has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants employed regularly issued legal process to compel performance of some act, with intent to do harm without excuse or justification, in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process, for the reasons stated in Defendants’ respective memoranda of law. (Dkt. No. 11, Attach. 5, at 12-14 [Cty. Defs.’ Mem. of Law]; Dkt. No. 14, Attach. 3, at 10-12[Gloversville Defs.’ Mem. of Law]; Dkt. No. 26, Attach. 3, at 12-14 [Def. Ashdown’s Mem. of Law]; Dkt. No. 27, Attach. 3, at 14-15 [Def. Bazan’s Mem. of Law].) For example, while the Complaint generally alleges that Defendants were maliciously motivated to use the “trump” criminal charge to coerce Plaintiff into discontinuing his civil lawsuit against Mr. Andrews (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 16-18 [Pl.’s Compl.]), it does not plausibly suggest a collateral objective because the allegations plausibly suggest merely a malicious motive. *See Savino v. City of New York*, 331 F.3d 63, 77 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a “malicious motive alone” is not a “collateral objective”); *Perry v. Manocherian*, 675 F. Supp. 1417, 1429 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that a

⁷ The Court notes that, in *Jones v. J.C. Penny’s Dep’t Stores Inc.*, 317 F. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit, in a non-precedential summary order, indicated its support for the interpretation that probable cause is a complete defense to an abuse of process claim. *Jones*, 317 F. App’x at 74 (holding that “[t]he conclusion that [the plaintiff] could not prevail on her claims that the officers lacked probable cause for her arrest . . . required dismissal of her . . . claims of abuse of process”). Under *Jones*, Plaintiff’s malicious abuse of process claim would clearly fail because, as discussed above in Part IV.A. of this Decision and Order, probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest has already been established. At the very least, Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity based on this ground.

“malicious motive alone . . . does not give rise to a cause of action for abuse of process” and holding that issuance of a summons and complaint, even if made with the intent to coerce settlement, does not constitute abuse of process).

C. Whether Plaintiff’s Conspiracy Claim Under §§ 1983 and 1985 Should Be Dismissed

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons set forth below

1. Conspiracy Claim Under § 1983

“To establish a § 1983 conspiracy, plaintiff must prove ‘(1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.’” *Mitchell v. Cty. of Nassau*, 786 F. Supp. 2d 545, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting *Pangburn v. Culbertson*, 200 F.3d 65, 72 [2d Cir. 1999]). “In addition, complaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed; diffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by specific instances of misconduct.” *Ciambriello v. Cty. of Nassau*, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted); *accord*, *Gallop v. Cheney*, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011). Finally, “a § 1983 conspiracy fails as a matter of law where there is no underlying constitutional violation.” *Mitchell*, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 564; *accord*, *Trombley v. O’Neill*, 929 F. Supp. 2d 81, 97 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (Suddaby, J.).

Here, Plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claim is dismissed because his underlying constitutional claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and malicious abuse of power have been dismissed. In any event, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s allegations, even when read with the utmost of special liberality, are impermissibly vague and conclusory to plausibly suggest a conspiracy.

2. Conspiracy Claim Under § 1985

“To avoid dismissal of a § 1985 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States; and (5) the conspiracy is motivated by some racial or perhaps otherwise invidious discriminatory animus.” *K.W. ex rel. Brown v. City of New York*, 275 F.R.D. 393, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).

Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a conspiracy and/or an underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim is likewise dismissed. *See Alston v. Sebelius*, 13-CV-4537, 2014 WL 4374644, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014) (stating that, “given that plaintiff has failed to allege an underlying claim for a constitutional violation, his conspiracy claim under Section 1985 cannot stand.”). In addition, the Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint is devoid of any facts plausibly suggesting that their alleged actions were motivated by racial or discriminatory animus or that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class.

D. Whether Plaintiff’s Claim for “Refusing or Neglecting to Prevent” Should Be Dismissed

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the following two reasons.

First, the Court construes this claim as an attempt to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. *See Bromfield v. Lend-Mor Mortg. Bankers Corp.*, 15-CV-1103, 2016 WL 632443, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2016) (reading *pro se* plaintiff’s claim that defendants “violated [her] constitutionally protected Rights by refusing or neglecting to prevent deprivation of [her] rights under Color of Law” as a claim under § 1986).

Second, because Plaintiff's § 1985 claim is dismissed, his § 1986 claim must also be dismissed. *See Gagliardi v. Vill. of Pawling*, 18 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that “[a] claim under Section 1986 . . . lies only if there is a viable conspiracy claim under 1985”); *accord*, *Carris v. First Student, Inc.*, 132 F. Supp. 3d 321, 361 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, J.).

E. Whether Plaintiff's *Monell* Claim Against the Johnstown Police Department and Gloversville Police Department Should Be Dismissed

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for each of the two reasons set forth below.

First, because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff's underlying constitutional claims, his *Monell* claim must also be dismissed. *See Segal v. City of New York*, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the district court properly found no underlying constitutional violation, its decision not to address the municipal defendants’ liability under *Monell* was entirely correct”); *accord*, *Grega v. Pettengill*, 123 F. Supp. 3d 517, 556 (D. Vt. 2015).

Second, in any event, police departments are not municipalities or “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. *See Nicholson v. Lenczewski*, 356 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding that, “[b]ecause a municipal police department is not an independent legal entity, it is not subject to suit under [§] 1983”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Plaintiff's *Monell* claim is dismissed on this additional basis.

F. Whether Plaintiff Has Alleged Facts Plausibly Suggesting a Supervisory Liability Claim Against Defendants Gifford and VanDeusen

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the negative for the reasons stated in Defendants’ respective memoranda of law. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 3, at 7-8 [Johnstown Defs.’ Mem. of Law]; Dkt. No. 14, Attach. 3, at 19-20 [Gloversville Defs.’ Mem. of Law].). In addition to those reasons, the Court adds the following two points.

First, this claim is dismissed on the basis that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation because his claims have been dismissed. *See Lacey v. Yates Cty.*, 30 F. Supp. 3d 213, 227 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that, “[a]s a threshold matter, where a plaintiff has not established any underlying constitutional violation, [he] cannot state a claim for § 1983 supervisory liability”) (internal quotations omitted); *accord, Lawrence v. Evans*, 136 F. Supp. 3d 486, 491 (W.D.N.Y. 2015).

Second, even if the merits of Plaintiff’s claim were considered, the Court notes that the only allegation regarding Defendant VanDeusen’s personal involvement in this matter is his failure “to train, supervise and discipline Captain Sira for his conflicted and malice acts[,]” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 46 [Pl.’s Compl.]), which is wholly conclusory and insufficient to plausibly suggest his personal involvement in a constitutional violation. *See Davis v. Cty of Nassau*, 355 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that “[a] complaint that essentially regurgitates the relevant ‘personal involvement’ standard, without offering any facts indicating that, or how, an individual defendant in a supervisory role was personally involved in a constitutional violation, cannot withstand dismissal.”); *Tricoles v. Bumpus*, 05-CV-3728, 2006 WL 767897, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2006) (“Courts have dismissed § 1983 . . . claims where a complaint merely asserts bare conclusory statements that a defendant supervisor failed to supervise or train”); *Pravda v. City of Albany*, 956 F. Supp. 174, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (Scullin, J.) (granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, where *pro se* plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations” that county jail superintendent and county sheriff were responsible for setting county policy and supervising corrections officers involved in abuse were “insufficient to establish the personal involvement of these individual Defendants in Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivations”).

G. Whether Plaintiff's State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Should Be Dismissed

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in Defendants' respective memoranda of law regarding Plaintiff's failure to serve Defendants' with a notice of claim as required by N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e. *See Rivas v. Suffolk Cty.*, 326 F. Supp. 2d 355, 360-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to serve the required notice of claim, and the plaintiff has not denied such contentions in his reply papers. In the absence of such a filing, the plaintiff's tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . must be dismissed"). In addition, the Court notes that it does not have the authority to consider a motion for leave to file a late notice of claim. *Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Vill. of Wesley Hills*, 815 F. Supp. 2d 679, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed.

H. Whether Plaintiff Should Be Afforded Leave to Amend His Complaint

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in negative for the reasons set forth below.

Generally, *pro se* civil rights litigants, such as Plaintiff, are to be afforded special solicitude in this Circuit. *See, e.g., Sykes v. James*, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that the liberal pleading standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[b][6] "applies with greater force when the complaint is submitted *pro se* or the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations"). As a result, where a *pro se* complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court generally "should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." *Cuoco v. Moritsugu*, 222 F.3d 99, 112

(2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff]’s causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” *Cuoco*, 222 F.3d at 112.

Here, the Court finds that the defects with Plaintiff’s claims are substantive, rather than formal, such that any amendments would be futile. More specifically, the Court has found that Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, malicious abuse of power, and malicious abuse of process are time-barred and, therefore, cannot be cured by better pleading. *See Mackensworth v. S.S. Am. Merch.*, 28 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding denial of leave to amend complaint proper on futility grounds because proposed claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations); *Diallo v. Williams*, 04-CV-4556, 2006 WL 156158, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006) (denying plaintiff’s motion to amend to include § 1983 claims as futile where the claims would be barred by the statute of limitations). With respect to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, the Court has found that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of probable cause for his arrest and, therefore, cannot establish the necessary elements for his claim.

Finally, because Plaintiff cannot establish an underlying constitutional violation, any amendments to his § 1983 and conspiracy claims would be futile. Similarly, any amendments to Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress would also be futile because he has failed to serve a notice of claim.

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Defendants Fulton County and Louise Sira’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 11) is **GRANTED**; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants' Gloversville Police Department, John P. Sira, Jr. and Donald Vandeusen's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 14) is **GRANTED**; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant Jesse Ashdown's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 26) is **GRANTED**; and it is further


ORDERED that Defendant Darryl Bazan's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 27) is **GRANTED**; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants Mark Gifford, David Gilbo and Johnstown Police Department's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 30) is **GRANTED**; and is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is **DISMISSED** in its entirety with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close this case.

Dated: July 27, 2016
Syracuse, New York


Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief U.S. District Judge